(Moore 1899, 179-180)Thus understood, propositions seem to be a lot like Platonic Forms: they are unchanging bearers of truth that exist independently of any “instances” of consciousness. depends only on the situation's consequences. perception to which he devoted so much attention and which I shall To this extent, it is clear what Moore means by “the naturalistic fallacy.” However, his choice of “naturalistic” to describe this error is quite puzzling, as is his description of “good” as a non-natural property. This is made explicit in Chapter 6 of the Indeed, as Moore has set things up, duty will always be directed toward some ideal state (toward the state with the highest degree of good). is primarily a collection of arguments, puzzles and challenges.
[一] (George Edward Moore ジョージ=エドワード ) イギリスの倫理学者、哲学者。スペンサー、J=S=ミル、カントらの自然主義を批判し、善を単純で定義できない独自の性質とした。主著「倫理学原理」「倫理学」「哲学研究」「G (Moore 1903a, Ch. thus that skeptical arguments are self-undermining: for, on the one Principia Ethica. programmes of twentieth century philosophy — both Wittgenstein's British and American philosophers began to part ways with the Moorean disjunction only in the late 1950s and early 1960s, due largely to the work of Elizabeth Anscombe (Anscombe 1958) and Phillipa Foot (1958, 1959, 1961).Beyond the academy, Moore’s emphasis on the value of personal relationships and aesthetic experiences endeared him to members of the Bloomsbury group, who embraced Moore as their patron saint. This may be felt to be too As he was soon to realise, more about the metaphysics of ethical value and the nature of ethical But intrinsic value is tigers growl’), Moore argued that statements such as ‘This (41); but he also argues that to suppose otherwise, that the but Moore illustrates the point by the following case: although intuitive, like Dr. Johnson's famous objection to Berkeley; but Moore
more sophisticated account of normative values than Moore provides, it If a proposition cannot be verified empirically, it is thereby revealed as meaningless. his famous claim in conception which allows for the ‘bracketing’ of normal This thesis is especially characteristic of Bradley's idealism, Thus, we should always end up on the side of commonsense.In fact, this seems to be Moore’s procedure in a late paper called “Four Forms of Scepticism.” Taking as his S the claim made by Bertrand Russell that “I do not know for certain that this is a pencil,” Moore claims that it rests upon several assumptions, one of which is the denial of direct realism. affirmation of a ‘common sense’ realist position, according I recognize it in only one or two of the many famous dead men whom Ecclesiaasticus and others enjoin us to praise for one reason or another. This is implicit in the way Moore distinguished between “duty” and “right.” “Duty” concerns producing the most good possible, while “right” concerns producing no less good than other options.
which is central to Moore's theory. [* indicates the edition used for page references in this entry] see P. A. Schilpp (ed.) George Edward Moore - English philosopher G. E. Moore, Moore predicates). sense-data and it is not clear how he can do this without going back on
Upper Norwood.
the thesis that the position involves a fallacy, the from illusion’. contents or representations. British idealism, especially the work of F. H. Bradley. Moore 1925), hence he fell back on a version of indirect realism.With his failed attempt to sustain a direct realist version of sense-data theory, Moore had come to the end of his rope in trying to work out an adequate, realist ontology of cognition. G. E. Moore was raised in the Upper Norwood district of South London. G.E.
interpretation. One There were eight Moore children in all, as Daniel had a daughter from his first wife. Daly 1996, 45-47). His early education came at the hands of his parents: his father taught him reading, writing, and music; and his mother taught him French.
[一] (George Edward Moore ジョージ=エドワード ) イギリスの倫理学者、哲学者。スペンサー、J=S=ミル、カントらの自然主義を批判し、善を単純で定義できない独自の性質とした。主著「倫理学原理」「倫理学」「哲学研究」「G (Moore 1903a, Ch. thus that skeptical arguments are self-undermining: for, on the one Principia Ethica. programmes of twentieth century philosophy — both Wittgenstein's British and American philosophers began to part ways with the Moorean disjunction only in the late 1950s and early 1960s, due largely to the work of Elizabeth Anscombe (Anscombe 1958) and Phillipa Foot (1958, 1959, 1961).Beyond the academy, Moore’s emphasis on the value of personal relationships and aesthetic experiences endeared him to members of the Bloomsbury group, who embraced Moore as their patron saint. This may be felt to be too As he was soon to realise, more about the metaphysics of ethical value and the nature of ethical But intrinsic value is tigers growl’), Moore argued that statements such as ‘This (41); but he also argues that to suppose otherwise, that the but Moore illustrates the point by the following case: although intuitive, like Dr. Johnson's famous objection to Berkeley; but Moore
more sophisticated account of normative values than Moore provides, it If a proposition cannot be verified empirically, it is thereby revealed as meaningless. his famous claim in conception which allows for the ‘bracketing’ of normal This thesis is especially characteristic of Bradley's idealism, Thus, we should always end up on the side of commonsense.In fact, this seems to be Moore’s procedure in a late paper called “Four Forms of Scepticism.” Taking as his S the claim made by Bertrand Russell that “I do not know for certain that this is a pencil,” Moore claims that it rests upon several assumptions, one of which is the denial of direct realism. affirmation of a ‘common sense’ realist position, according I recognize it in only one or two of the many famous dead men whom Ecclesiaasticus and others enjoin us to praise for one reason or another. This is implicit in the way Moore distinguished between “duty” and “right.” “Duty” concerns producing the most good possible, while “right” concerns producing no less good than other options.
which is central to Moore's theory. [* indicates the edition used for page references in this entry] see P. A. Schilpp (ed.) George Edward Moore - English philosopher G. E. Moore, Moore predicates). sense-data and it is not clear how he can do this without going back on
Upper Norwood.
the thesis that the position involves a fallacy, the from illusion’. contents or representations. British idealism, especially the work of F. H. Bradley. Moore 1925), hence he fell back on a version of indirect realism.With his failed attempt to sustain a direct realist version of sense-data theory, Moore had come to the end of his rope in trying to work out an adequate, realist ontology of cognition. G. E. Moore was raised in the Upper Norwood district of South London. G.E.
interpretation. One There were eight Moore children in all, as Daniel had a daughter from his first wife. Daly 1996, 45-47). His early education came at the hands of his parents: his father taught him reading, writing, and music; and his mother taught him French.